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In recent years, many advocate the setting up of a centra 1
provident fund system in Hong Kong, but little formal analysis
has been done on the subject. This paper tries to give a study
on the possible effects of the imposition of a contributory
pension scheme. Two aspects of the system are focused in the
study -- namely the effects on individual's economic behavior and
the possible efficiency impact according to the Pareto principle.
With the experience of other neighboring countries, like
Singapore, the provident fund system is not actually fair on
actuarial basis since it incurs a large sum of operating cost.
Also the individuals may not be so rational in making decision as
they may be myopic in the sense that the pension benefits or even
a l l future benef its are understated. I t may be due to the lack of
information or confidence in the system. For these two aspects,
some investigations wi 1 1 be done and the role of a mandatory
system will be highlighted.
In the study of the efficiency impact of the scheme, two
systems will be compared -- the 'fully-funded' system and the
'pay-as-you-go' scheme. We do not focus in distinguishing the
difference of the two systems in detail, but point out that the
latter may be potentially Pareto superior to the fully-funded
system if appropriate restrictions are imposed on the rate of
contributions.
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1.1 Definition of Pension Fund
Pension fund can take a number of forms, but basically
benefits are paid to the employees at their time of retirement.
The payment could be on an annuity basis or sometimes in a lump-
sum payment. The pension scheme can either be contributory or
non-contributory, which involves 3 kinds of resource transfers
interte.mporal (from preretirement savings to postretirenent
consumption), intergenerational (from young to old in the
population for pension benefits in the unfunded case, or from old
to young through the adjustment. of bequests), and intrageneratio-
na l (from the high income group to the low income class if the
scheme has a motive of redistribution).
Usually the Provident Fund system is a kind of contributory
private pension plan, and its funds come from the employer side
and the employees contributions. A social insurance program has 3
sources of contributions: namely the employers, employees and
the Government. The program can be financed either from any one
of the sources or both, or even all of them. In most cases,
pension programs under social insurance have tripartite
financing, i.e. the funds come from all 3 sources. Among those
with bipartite financing, employer-employee contributions are the
principal form.
21.2 Historical Background
1.21 Common trends in the development of Social Security System
Private pension plans and social insurance have been
developed throughout the world for many years. They usually come
after public assistance in the stages of social security
development in most countries. As mentioned in the Comparative
Social Administration, Social Insurance came later than Public
Assistance, when the State became concerned, and could afford to
help, the working classes generally by giving statutory
recognition and support to their own mutual aid, or to their
employers' occupational welfare scheme."
1.22 Hong kong : AttitudeStowarCASretirementsche.mes
In Hong Kong, retirement schemes is not so popular and
people have 1 ittl e knowledge about it. The schemes began to
sprout in the past two decades due to the changing culture of
Hong Kong people and employers' opinion. According to a report
(1967) by the Inter-departmental Working Party which was set up
in 1966 to examine the social security system in Hong Kong1, it
was observed that the Chinese tradition of responsibility for the
aged had been weakening under the rapid development of Hong Kong
and the pressures of over-crowded urban life. Employers consider
the role of the schemes is to give security to employees, a
moral obligation to maintain company's goodwill and a competitive
tool in the labor market.2 In the period 1973-78, the number of
companies providing approved retirement schemes has almost
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doubled, as shown in Table 13.
Today, retirement schemes remains a hot topic due to the
rising expectations of the,,Hong Kong's population. The trends in
the age structure show 'that the Hong Kong population is aging
because of low birth rates and higher life expectancy. Over the
period 1981-2001, the proportion aged 60 and over will increase
from 10.3 per cent to 14.1 per cent. Assuming the retirement age
is 60, the number of people in Hong Kong who are at this age
group in 1981 is 528,000 (about 10.3% of total population).
According to the revised 20-Year Population Projection conducted
by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Depaartment in 1984, the
figure would amount to 910,000 (about 14.1% of the total
population projected) in 2001. Detail figures about the
population projection between the period 1981-2000, for every
five years, are listed in Table 2.
TABLE 1
New Schemes Amended Schemes Total Number of
Approved Approved Approved Schemes
1973-74 56 14C 774 (up to 31 March,74)
1974-75 103 91 877 (up to 31 March,75)
1975-76 154 113 1031 (up to 31 March,76)
1976-77 185 144 1216 (up to 31 M4larch,77)
1977-78 192 170 1408 (up to 31 March,78)
Source: Inland Revenue Department Report 1973-1978
In recent years, many active pressure groups arise,
especially those concern with workers' benefits4. They urge for
more statutory labor protections from the Government. With regard
to workers' well-being after retirement, they propose the
introduction oi a compulsory, self-help and contributory social
security scheme through the setting up of a Cent ra 1 P ro vident
Fund. Such a scheme requires a central-administered institution,




The numbers are measured in thousands
Source: Hong Kong Population, A 20-Year Projection (Revised Ed.), Noy.,198
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong
Let us look at the Government's attitude towards the issu
through time. As early as 1965, the social security problem ha
been discussed and the Financial Secretary pointed out that tl
Government was prepared to devote serious study to t h
practicability of certain types of contributory social securit
schemes.5 The idea was supported by a report of an Inter
departmental Working Party in 1967 and the Working Party did no
accept the contention that the principle of f i n ancia
However the Government was still not in favour of the
introduction of a compulsory, contributory social security sche
for three reasons, as stated in the 1973 White Paper on t
future development of social services in Hong Kong: namely th
the people of Hong Kong would not accept a compulsor
contributory scheme, that if the financial burden was placed on
employers only, then it would be too different from the
experiences of other countries, and that the necessary
administrative preparation for the plan were too complicated
that it required a lengthy preparatory period.
Although the position of the Government changed slightly and
suggested to establish a centrally administered contributory
scheme for sickness, injury and death in the Green Paper (1977)
on A programme for Social Security Development, it had been
mentioned that with the exception of the role of occupational
benefits, especially retirement benefits, on the contracting-out
of the sickness, injury and death benefit scheme, the Government
did not expect it to play an enlarged role.-5 It was further
confirmed in the publication of the White Paper on Social
Welfare into the 1980's, 18 months later, that Occupational
benefits provided by employers, either voluntarily or
statutorily, have a definite role to play in the social security
structure... a valuable supplement to the social security system
developed by the Government. However, the Government did not see
occupational benefits as playing a predominant role in the
overall social security framework.9
As we can see, the value of retirement schemes was
recognised by the Government, but it did not take priority in the
Social Security Development as compared with other social
services. In a seminar, held in September 14,1985, on the Central
Provident Fund, the Registrar-General and the Central Provident
Fund Sub-committee of the Employers' Federation believed that
6
"Hong Kong would not have a government-administered Central
Provident Fund (CPF)--- at least not in the near future
because employers and' employees would not welcome a CPF as both
parties would be bounded by law to contribute.10
From the above viewpoints, compulsory, contributory
retirement scheme will not be introduced in the near future and
one of the main reasons is the reluctance of employees and
employers to join the program. However some surveys have been
undertaken in Hong Kong on the subject of people's attitude
towards a social insurance program. Though the scope of the
surveys is limited (the respondents fall mainly in the working,
class and low-wages group), the results are important in the
analysis of people's opinions on the subject since they were
organised by institutions of different nature: namely voluntary
institution, academic institution and labor institution, and the
coverage of the surveys included over ten thousand respondents in
total.
About 65-91% of the respondents urge for the need to provide
insurance for the aged and retirees, and 65-8410 are willing to
join a social insurance program (see Table 3). For those who were
reluctant to join the scheme, lack of confidence and information
about the system was one of the major arguments. Therefore, the
introduction of a compulsory pension scheme seems to be
acceptable by the people, unlike the Government's argument, if
the propaganda and education about the system are done well.
Before making a firm decision, further investigations must be
done on a larger scale--- not only on the number of respondents,
7but also to consider employers' opinions.
TABLE 3
Respondents' opinions on soical insurance
Christian Iriustrral Department of Hong Kong
Committee FederationSocial Work,
Baptist College Trade Unions
(500 respondents) (1693 respondets) (9033 respondents)
urge for the need to
set up social insurance 84.4% 88.9% 61.3%
willing to join social
84.4% 65.1%insurance program 83.6%
willing to pay
contribution of not 66.8% 56.7% 83.6%
less than 2% of income
willing to pay
contribution of not 39.2% 13.2%
less than 5% of income
urge for the need to
provide insurance for 65.2% 90.2% 91.3%
the aged and retirees
Source: Insurance for laborers in 80's, Social Service Group,
HKUSU, 1981-1982
1.23 Nature of retirement schemes
If some sort of retirement scheme is acceptable, it is
necessary to distinguish the types of the system, and study the
recent retirement practices in Hong Kong and experiences of other
countries. Though Provident Fund can give benefits to the aged,
it is not a form of insurance against the contingencies of old
age, since it is a kind of contributory saving (or forced saving
8if the scheme is compulsory) with no risk-pooling element. If
individuals are rational or they are proper life-cyclers, they
can always plan for their future through private savings, then
the effect of the system Is minimal. Therefore it is necessary to
convert a Provident Fund System into an insurance scheme such
that resources are pooled between employees facing various risks.
Pension scheme differs from public assistance in two ways.
First, the former is a non-means-tested scheme since it is a
contributory, self-help plan. Second, the former does not have a
re-distributive role in helping the poor. With the experiences of
other countries, like Britain, Norway, Canada and France, one
would see that actuarially sound and satisfactory insurance
schemes... were designed to supplement rather than to replace a
basic scheme which was providing only a minimal benefit. Any
redistribution between different income levels was achieved much
more equitably through a basic scheme.11 Therefore it is
important to eliminate the common misconception that a
contributory social security scheme is aimed at helping the poor,
so that the employees in the high-income group no longer worry
about their subsidization to the poor under the scheme.
1.24 Classification of pension fund systems & Recent retirement
practices in Hong Kong
Employees may receive their retirement benefits in the form
of monthly payment or in a lump-sum payment. In Hong Kong, the
pension scheme is adopted more by larger and well-established
companies while the lump-sum payment method is adopted more by
small and medium-sized ones. Pension plans can be b roa d 1 y
classified into 2 categories Funded Pension Plans and
Unfunded Pension Plans (Pay-as-you-go system is the most common
form of unfunded plans). Funded pension plans give the most
protection for the employees as the fund is independent from the
employer's financial- position. Usually the contributions are kept
in the form of 'Trust Fund' and invested in a diversified
portfolio. Unfunded plans have no reserve or fund set aside by
the employer. Thus the protection or security to employees is
smaller and there is a danger that employees would receive
nothing when the firm goes bankrupt.
In the United States, the first private p e nsion pi an wa s
adopted by American Express in 1875 while the social security
system was established in 1935. In the Social Security Act of
1935, retired workers were protected under the Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program which
required compulsory participation by the vast majority of
employees and presumably would continue to operate in the future.
Though the program also provides benefits to disabled workers,
and their dependents and to survivors of insured workers, the
following discussion only focuses on the retirement aspect of the
system.
In 1940, private pension plans only included about 4 mil lie
persons, but the number rose by more than ten times, amounting t
almost 43 million in 1980. Besides private plans, most worker
were covered by the OASDI program at the same time. The number of
workers with OASDI coverage increased from 69.8 million in 1971
to 79.7 million in 1976,. while the proportion aged 65 and over
receiving OASDI cash benefits in the population was more than 80
per cent in the 70' s (see Table 4). The size of the program
expanded rapidly in these years and the trend in the total
benefit expenditure spent on pensions also grew up year by year
(see Table 5). From the figures given, one can see the
significance of retirement schemes, both private and public
plans, in the U.S. economy in the protection of workers against
old age.
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Source: The cost of Social Security (Ninth Eleventh International
Inquiry) International Labour Office. Geneva
note: The values of pensions are calculated by using the
figures of pensions as a percentage of total benefit
expenditure under the branch of Social Insurance
Assimilated Schemes Family Allowances and the
percentage of the branch of Social Insurance
Assimilated Schemes Family Allowances in the total
benefit expenditure
Q f)K t oo t i uo i--f T K q o fn
Today many social groups and the Government have stated
their own opinions on the possibility of introducing a Central
Provident Fund System or a Compulsory Retirement Scheme in
Hong Kong. Advantages and defects of the program are many, but a
formal economic analysis on the subject is indispensable in the
evaluation of this question.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possible
effects on the economic behavior of members who join a
contibutory, risk-poo ling retirement scheme. More importantly,
welfare effect or efficiency impact of the scheme will be
investigated.
In most cases, individua1s.are considered to be proper life-
cyclers and the pension scheme is actuarial fair. However people
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may be myopic, I.e. the future benefits are understated, in the
case of Hong Kong because, they are not fully-informed about the
system and they may have little confidence in the program and
also in the political stability of Hong Kong in the future. The
role of the Government, if the program is to be started in the
future, is vital in correcting the distorted individuals'
behavior due to their shortsightedness. Also if the scheme is
not actuarial fair due to the inclusion of administrative cost,
then the expected benefits received by the individuals will be
less than their contributions made. In this case, we will see,
under what level of cost (tolerable cost), the benefits from
risk-pooling exceeds the loss from actuarial unfairness. 5
This study gives a partial analysis on the subject with
stochastic over-lapping generations. In a more complete way, a
general equilibrium model should be set up, which includes the
production sector, labor market and the financial market, in a
stochastic overlapping generations environment. However this is
beyond the scope of this study. Future works are open to those
who are interested in these issues.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Nature of the Svstem
Recent discussions on the Social Security System have
focused on its effects on private savings,and hence the aggregate
capital accumulation, and the retirement decision of the
individuals. In most: papers, the Social Security System on a pay-
as-you-go basis in the United Slates was discussed. Some reasons
have been stated in Barro (1974), Diamond (1977) and Kotlikoff
(1979) that the original 1935 legislation authorized the
accumulation of a large trust fund in the program, but it was
abandoned with the 1939 amendments which transformed the original
system into a pay-as-you-go basis. Though the program today
involves some amount of reserves, the size of the trust fund is
relatively small to the estimated liabilities. For example, the
trust fund was approximately 45 billions as compare with the 2.4
trillions estimated liabilities in 1976. Also, in Barro's view,
the funded system and the unfunded system are roughly equivalent
if individuals take fully account of the welfare of their heirs
through the adjustment of bequests, thus it makes no different to
study either the fully-funded system or the unfunded program.
2.2 Effects on orivate savings
Under a pay-as-you-go basis, a reduction in private savings
is equivalent to th.e. same- reduction in national savings since
there is no accumn1 ated social security fund,or the decrease in
private savings does not match a corresponding increase in public
savings. It is this reason that there are many writers who are
interested in the study of the effects of trie Social Security
System on the changes in private savings. In their studies, two
categories of results can be classified: namely theoretical
arguments and empirical evidences on the subject.
2.21 Theoretical arguments
According to Barro's results (1974), consumption, private
savings and aggregate savings do not change due to the
introduction of a Social Securiy System, no matter whether it is
fully-funded or unfunded. It is because the pension benefits in
future act as a perfect substitute for private savings if the
contributions to the system are invested at the market rate of
interest under a fully-funded system. Under a pay-as-you-go
program, future pension benefits become a perfect substitute for
private bequests. Therefore marginal changes in social security
payments of imposed intergenerational transfers have no real
effects when current and future generations are already connected
by a chain of operative discretionary transfers.
Barro's conclusion, on the changes in savings, did not get
the support of Feldstein (1974, 1976, 1978) and Sheshinski
Weiss (1979). The effects on private savings is indeed ambiguous
because there are two induced opposing forces in determining
private savings: substitute asset effect and inducement to
retire effect (Feldstein). F utur e pension be n efits act as a
substitute for househo1d assets, and thus the pre-retirement
savings will be reduced as obtained in a traditional life cycle
model. But on the other hand, the induced earlier retirement of
individuals will cause them to save more since the retirement
period is now longer. As a result, the direction of changes in
savings depends on the relative strength o f t: he two forces.
Also other factors account for the changes in total asset
taccumulation, i.e. an increase in private pension benefits? is not
a one-for-one substitution for direct savings, since the rate of
return of investment in the annuity market may exceed the market
interest rate. It is because of the favorable tax treatment to
the pension contributions and the favorable terms for group
purchases of insurance. Besides, the expected rate of return may
again exceed the market rate if risk-pooling is possible, under a
world of life uncertainty [Sheshinski Weiss (1979)].
2.22 Empirical_results
The theoretical debate seems to have no clear-cut
conclusion, which depends on the assumptions made and further
empirical testing on the effects is desirable. Feldstein (1974)
found that the Social Security System depressed savings by 30-
50%, while Kotlikoff (1979) also agreed the result of negative
effect on accumulated savings. However D.Leimer and S.Lesnoy
(1980) pointed out that Feldstein's result was based on an error
in computer alogorithm,' a n d t h e n e g a t i v e imp a c t on s a v i n g s
disappeared if the error was corrected by reanalyzing the same
set of data. Juster (.1982) accounted for this divergence results
to be their inability to generate independent observations in
time series data since income also rose in the period studied.
The results obtained in cross-section analysis, by Katona (1964)
and Cagan(1965), contradicted the Feldstein conclusion in that
people tended to save more with the introduction of the program.
They used the recognition effect and th e goal gradient
hypothesis to interpret this phenomenon: people were alerted by
'the importance of savings for retirement in joining the scheme,
and effort is intensified the closer one is to one's goal
In chapter 3, the effects of the introduction of a
contributory pension systemon savings will be discussed. The main
difference between the previous studies and this thesis is their
different focus in comparison. In this thesis, the initial case
with no pension is being compared with the case with pension.
Therefore any change in savings indicates can be attributed to
the pension system. The previous studies focus on the effects of
changing the optimal value of annuities under an existing pension
system on savings. It will be shown, in the coming chapters, that
private saving declines while the effects on aggregate saving is
ambiguous. This result coincides with the arguments in the
literature. Also the effect on postretirement consumption level
can be found to be positive due to the introduction of a pension
scheme.
2.3 Effects on retirement decisions
M a n y writers were also interested in the response of
individuals on their retirement decisions if the retirement date
is endogenous. Under the scheme, the labor supply in the
preretirement periods and the saving behavior will be affected.
People tend to work less later in life, but they may work rnore
and save more in their earlier years in anticipation of early
retirement.
Most studies, Feldstein (1974) Sheshinski (1978) and
Pel lechio (1979), have the same conclusion on the induced
earlier retirement due to the earnings test or mean-test
imposed upon the retirees for receiving the pension benefits. If
they are found out to be working after the retirement age, then
payroll taxes will be increased or their real social security
benefits will be reduced in size. Boskin Hurd (1978) also
pointed out that people will move among the 3 states: working,
semiretirement and complete retirement, if deduction in social
security benefits increases with the level of works after
retirement age.
However the negative effect on retirement may be offset, if
an appropariate system is designed, by allowing the benefits to
depend upon the retirement age, which will encourgage the
postponement of retirement [Sheshinski (1978)]. On the other
hand, some writers do not agree with the conclusion of negative
effect on savings as they argue that the possible effects of the
system on retirement depend on the actuarially fairness of the
scheme, uncertainty of the length of life, and the imperfection
of capital markets. [Crawford Lilien (1981)].
However the date of retirement is assumed to be exogenously
determined in this thesis because the proposed pension scheme is
a non-means-tested one and the main focus of the paper does not
consider changes in labor forces.
2• 4 SocajL_Secur i.ty_Sys tem_under_uncertainty
Studies of the Social Security System under uncertainty have
been done by Diamond Mirr lees (1978), Sheshinski Weiss
(1981), Enders Lapan (1982), Whinston (1982) and Abel (1985).
Faari (1965) began to study the effects of lifetime uncertainty
on individual behavior and subsequent works followed his model,
but little attention have been paid to the role of endogenous
bequest. Sheshinski Weiss(1981), based on Barro's works, showed
that fully-funded system was indeed equivalent to a pay-as-you-go
program if the initial bequest was left unaltered. However, it
was found in their paper that the system would incur real effects
on the individual's behavior since the increase in bequest
would not fully compensate the increased taxes on subsequent
generations, if individuals were making choice under life
uncertainty. Their results are different from Barro's conclusion
because risk-pooling is possible in their work, and thus
retirement benefits are not perfect substitute for private
savings since the expected rate of return of annuities now
exceeds the market rate of interest, and the individuals are
risk-averse.
Abe 1(1985) turned to focus on the accumulation of wealth
under life uncertainty' if people have no bequest motive.
Accidental bequests and precautionary savings would alter the
endogenous distribution of consumption, wealth and bequest as
different people would receive different sizes of bequests
because they may have different mortality history of the earlier
generations in their families. Abel found that social security
benefits would crowd out private wealth by more than one-for-one
basis, and thereby national wealth would be reduced.
Diamond Mirrlees, and Whinston have investigated in the
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the system if
f the earning ability of an individual is uncertain, while Enders
Lapan studied the role of output uncertainty in the
intergenerationa1 risk-sharing model. Since these works focus on
other aspects of the system, like unemployment benefits, we will
not go through them any further.
Most of the above studies are done in a partial-equilibrium
model which neglects the long run effects of the scheme.
Samuelson (1975), Hu (1979) and Burbidge (1983) have built up
general equilibrium models with overlapping generations (under
certainty) to study the optimal social security system and its
effects on labor supply and capital accumulation. It was shown
that the long run well-being of every subsequent generations can
be improved if appropriate (fully-funded) system is chosen as it
can bring the economy to the golden-rule equilibrium.
In the following chapters, the sole uncertainty element is
the life uncertainty after the retirement date. Endogenous
bequest, which is one kind of intergenerationa1 transfer, linked
up different generations together. Based on the model o f
Sheshinshki Weiss (1981.), the importance of changes in bequest
decision on the we If ar-e of subsequent generations wi 11 be
considered in chapters 6 and 7.
2.5 Arguments for a mandatory pension system
Ail these papers, either under certainty or under
uncertainty, concentrate o n t h te study of a n o p t i ni a 1 s o c i a 1
security system and its possible effects on individual's economic
behavior. From their works, some justifications can be drawn for
having a mandatory social security system. Samte1 son
(1975),Diamond (1977) and Feldstein (3 985) have pointed out that
imperfect foresight of individuals against the future may distort
their optimal decisions in preretirement savings. Peop1e may
overstate their probability of ability and interests to work at
full earinings level when they are old, and they may
underestimate the future benefits which can be obtained under the
social security system. Their lack of information about the
future and private myopic behaviour may induce the system to take
up the role to provide forced savings.
In addition, Diamond (1977) believed that market failure in
private annuities market is one of the major reason for the
adoption of a compulsory system since it can provide a safe real
rate of return which cannot be achieved by small investors, and
allow for an indexed annuity which are not available in the
private market. Also the government is considered to be able to
provide insurance more efficiently than the private market since
the transaction cost is lower. Diamond gave an example of the
comparable costs in- 1974. The administrative costs of the social
security system normally run at about 2% of the total receipts
(payments), while the total operating costs (expenses) amount to
about 17% in the whole life insurance industry.
The free-rider problem and the trouble of asymmetric
information also account for the superiority of a compulsory
social security system over the private ann u i t i e s market, in
Sheshinski Weiss (1981), it has been mentioned that voluntary
, private investment in annuities may be lower than th9 social
desirable level since people may expect to receive public
assistance or neglect the social externality of their potential
poverty. Therefore they tend to save less or consume more in
their preretirement periods and rely more on public assistance in
their later life. Abel (1985) agreed that a compulsory system is
immune to the problem of adverse selection if there are
asymmetric information on the probability of dying of different
consumers. Market failure will result if this private information
is only known by the individuals [Akerlof (1970)]. But on the
other hand, approapriate system can be formulated to monitor the
differential probabilities or induce the individuals to be self-
selective in the system. Optimum was shown to be the one which
offered a single pooling policy across a wide range of
different welfare weights in Diamond Mirrlees (1978) and
Whinston (1983).
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In chapter 4 and chapter 5, the significance of a mandatory
system will be discussed: In chapter 4, individuals are assumed
to be myopic in two ways. Based on the model. in Feldstein (1985)
but with element of life uncertainty added, agents either
understate their pension benefits or underestimate any future
receipts or both of them. In this case, a mandatory scheme can
help to correct the distorted behaviors of individuals due to
their shortsightedness. In chapter 5, the system is allowed to be
actuarially unfair, i.e. the expected receipt of individual
exceeds the expected contributions made. If the cost-sharing of
each individual is too high, then individual may be reluctant to
join the scheme. However the compulsory nature of the system can
guarantee the size of the program such that the cost-sharing
burden can be kept at its minimum.
2.6 Obstacles in the development ofthe systeE!
Beyond the possible negative effect of the system on
aggregate capital accumulation, the present system in united
States faces two large problems. People today still lack of the
understanding of the spirit and operation of the system, and the
possibility of sustained high levels of inflation may lower the
real pension benefits recieved [Robertson (1979)]. Therefore some
suggestions for the reform of the system have been given by
Merton who urged for a consumption-linked benefit instead of the
existing income-linked pension. It can free the system from the
problem of inflation because it can maintain the level of real
consumption per head.
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2.7 Preview of the study
In the following chapters, the linkage between the life
uncertianty aspect of an, individual and the risk-pooling property
of a contributory pension scheme will be discussed. First of all,
the effects of the introduction of a provident fund system on
private savings, as well as aggregate savings, will be
investigated. The sole uncertainty element in the study is the
random length of life of ter retirement, while the endogeneous
retirement decision is omitted. In the later part of the study,
the role of a mandatory pension scheme will be highlighted
through the discussions on. individuals' myopic behavior Yand the
nature of an actuarilly unfair pension system.
CHAPTER 3
MODEL
3.1 Focus of the paper
since the social security system was introduced in the
United States in 1935, nearly all previous studies on the subject
focused on the effects of an existing system on individuals'
behavior. Comparative statics were done to see the changes in
private savings due to a slight change in the optimal value of
annuities. However we are interested in studying the effects of
the system as compared with the initial situation, i.e. in the
absence of the system, especially in small places, like Hong Kong
where 'pension scheme' is not common.
3.2 Assumptions
A discrete-time, two-period life cycle model under life
uncertainty in the type of Sheshinski Weiss (1981) is used it
the following analysis on the effects of a fully-funded pension
scheme. Representative individual is assumed to live for two
periods: a working period of fixed duration and a retirement
period of random length which depends on the probability of dying
after the retirement age. Date of retirement is assumed to be
exogenously determined, and wages are paid according to
productivity which is assumed to be fixed during the working
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period, thus individuals have to plan for their preretirement
savings in order to meet their postretirement consumption.
Therefore an intertemporal choice of consumption plan is being
faced by each individual.
Individuals in different generations are linked up through
bequests. It is assumed that bequests are known prior to the
consumption and saving decisions of the young generation and act
as their initial wealth. Children are born at the end of the
working period of their parents, and they would receive the
bequests and start to work when their parents are deceasedl3
The population of the society is assumed to grow at a
constant rate g, and individuals are assumed to be able to
reproduce themselves in an Ameobic manner so as to get rid of
the complicated problem of family tree in the study of endogenous
bequests.
Initially, if there is no pension scheme, individual would
make an intertemporal choice on consumption between the working
period and his retirement period. For simplicity, we first
assume the time discount factor of consuming later to be unity.
Then individual faces a problem under which he has to decide how
much to save before he retires, how much to consume in his whole
life, and how much to be left to his descendants in the form of
bequests.
The utility function of preretirement consumption, U1(.),
may differ from the utility function of postretirement
consumption, U2(•) if we consider the style of life after
retirement is different. For example, more leisure is available
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to the individual. Without any loss of generality, we can
normalize the length of working period and the length of
retirement period to be one. The model is simplified to a two-
period model.
The individual faces the fol lowing intertemporal problem,
[I]
where L is the fraction of potential retirement period
that is actually realized and
W is the wage earned by the individual
r is one plus the market rate of interest for
saving in a small open economy, which is
exogenously determined in the international
capital market and therefore it is assumed to
be fixed (perfect capital market is also assumed)
B i is the per capita bequests left by generation i
to generation i+1
G is the number of children of each individual,
which is assumed to be fixed (equals 1+g)
h is the utility derived from leaving bequest to
the next generation (his descendants)
C1, C2, are the preretirement consumption,
postretirement consumption and private
savings at time t respectively
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3.3 Effects_on_gri.vatesavings
it the pension system is introduced, individual has an
option to buy annuities against future consumption. But the
saving behavior of the individual will be unaffected if the rate
of return on annuity equals the market interest rate14. However
the risk-pooling nature of the system allows its expected rate of
return to be higher than the market rate, though the return to
annuity is indeed uncertain due to the uncertainty. Under the
scheme, individual can choose his consumption plans and optimal
bequests so that his total expected utility in his whole life can
be maximized.
[II]
where ai is the amount of annuities bought by generation i
L is the expected length of life in retirement
If the system is actuarially fair, that is the expected
contributions received (plus the interest earned) and the
expected benefits payout are equal, then the expected rate of
return for annuity will ber/L(>r).
By substituting the corresponding constraints into problem
(I) and (II), the first-order conditions, with interior solutions
assumed, is given below, and the second order conditions in the













where '#' denotes ror optimai va.1ue ctiosen under the scheme
Proposition 1: Private savings would decrease as a result of
joining a pension scheme since part of the
private savings are crowded out by annuities
Proof : Suppose and then with
by (2) and (4). However the full-insurance
behavior obtained from the set of first-order
conditions, given h"<0 and Bi is monotone in L, implies
that since by (4) a nd
( 5)[ Sheshinski Weiss (1981) p.19 4]
with the individual's fu11- insurance
behavior is inconsistent with non-negative
consumption.
contradiction.
The result obtained in Proposition 1 is obvious because the
marginal utility of bequests are being equalized in all states
under the scheme, or put in other words,is independant for all
L as long as Co v( L, h'( B.j)) =0. Therefore the whole annuity serves
only the- purpose of postretirement c o n s u mpt ion, whi1e p riv at e
savings are reserved for bequests motive. However, under the
initial situation, private savings are used both to finance
postretirement consumption and bequests. Therefore the existence
of annuity may lessen the burden of private saving on financing
bequests and consumption, and thus it would drive out part of the
initial private savings.
3.4 Welfare effects on the_indi. v i. dua 1
propotion 2: The introduction of a pension scheme would
improve the well-being of the individuals who
are risk-averse if their initial bequests
received are unaffected.
Proof:
The maximum attainable utility without the scheme is by
substituting the optimal values of private savings, postretire-
ment consumption, and bequests into [I].
Correspondingly, the highest utility level obtained under
the scheme can be shown to be V j.
If the representative individual in generation i is risk-
neutral, then the solutions in the above two problems will be the
same by choosing the value of aggregate savings (S+aJ) and
consumption {C J) under the scheme to be the initial private
savings (S) and consumption (C?) because
where
i f. i• i
However V can be shown to be higher than V, by simply
choosing if the individual is risk-
averse.
.(5')
For simplicity, we assume that L takes 2 values only: L,
with probability (1-p) and L2 with probability p, where L L2.
Figure_l
It can be easily seen that (5') holds provided that
and
The upper bound constraint on the optimal value of annuity
above is only a sufficient condition which is motivated to show
that a pension scheme is indeed desirable under life uncertainty.
Though the aggregate savings, as constructed, in the two cases
are the same, the distribution between private savings and
annutity is significant to ensure that the individual is better
off with the introduction of the scheme.
Since the objective, of the scheme is to maintain the income
of the retirees at an acceptable level which is strictly above
the subsistence level irrespective of their life uncertainy. When
the value of annuity is set too high, though the income-
maintainence purpose of the scheme can be attained, the planned
bequests left to the next generation will be highly affected by
the random length of their actual life due to the corresponding
low value of private savings.
Now let us consider a general case, if L takes more than 2
rvalues. We take the Taylor series expansion on the expected
utility of bequests in V and V around their mean value,
assuming that the higher order central moment around mean exists
in the problem.
Without the scheme,
where h.o.t. are the higher order terms in the expansion,
and are neglected.
With the scheme, one may choose and though
it may be non-optimal in problem [II],




Proposition: Due to the pension scheme, retirement
consumption level rises but the effect on





by (1) and (3)
by (4) and (5)
by (6)
From the second constraint of problem [I],
therefore L and are postively correlated since Hence
and is a possible solution to the problem
Similarly, we cannot rule out the case that and
However the case that both aggregate savings and
retirement consumption decrease as a result of the introduction
of a pension scheme can be eliminated since it violates the fact
that
The remaining case under which the retirement consumption
would fall even though the aggregate savings begin to pile up can
be shown to impossible as follow,
Lemma_l1: I f i.e. the marginal utility of bequests is
decreasing at an increasing rate, then
and are inconsistent.
Proof and where
, where . T h e n
But, by (2) arid (4), is greater than
contradiction
It has been shown in proposition 2 that individual in
generation i must be better off, thus if the last case is valid,
then the decrease in utility resulted from more preretirement
savings (or less consumption in the working period) and lower
postretirement consumption must be compensated sufficiently by
the utility gains from the accumulation of more bequests to the
next generation. But if the marginal utility of leaving bequests
decreases at an increasing rate, then the derived utility gains
from the piling up of bequests will fail at a faster rate such
that it makes the compensation impossible.
From the results above, the effect of a pension scheme on
postretirement consumption is certain. More consumption will be
available during the retirement period because more protection
is now given to the retirees. On the other hand, the direction of
change in total savings is shown to be theoretically
indeterminate under the life cycle model with life uncertainty.
Two forces cause the, total savings to change: First,
individual may intend tcr save less since the pension scheme can
free him fro.m the trouble of randomness in life, that is, his
income (consumption) level in retirement can be protected. The
private savings now only serve for the purpose of forming
bequests, thus a more comprehensive plan can be constructed.
Second, the higher expected rate of return attracts more
resources to be a 1 1 o t e d in the purchase of annuities. As a
result, the ultimate effect of a pension scheme on total savings
is inconclusive, depending on the relative strength of the two
forces.
The planned postretirement consumption in the initial
situation is lower than that in the latter case
because individual is assumed to make decisions in his working
period. While he plans for his consumption level and saving rate,
he does not know when he will die in the next period. Therefore
if he desires to consume too much after retirement, a huge amount
of savings must be accumulated. If he dies at the beginning of
his second part of life, a great amount of bequests will be left
to his descendants. However a loss in utility will be resulted




4• -1 Specif ic_soI ut ions__wi th_tme_di. scount.ing_f ac tor
In the previous chapter, resources for future uses and
present consumption are of equal importance to the individual.
However the consumer may give a smaller weight to the utility
of future consumption and bequests even if he has perfect
foresight on his future benefits. It is because if t hfe consumer
reallocates his resources from present consumption to future
uses, he can obtain a markup which equals to the market rate of
return, but on the other hand, the value of future consumption
may be lower due to the postponement in enjoying the benefits.
If there is a time discounting factor in the evaluation of
utility of future uses, the consumer- is trying to choose the
appropriate consumption levels and rate of savings over time in
order to maximize the present value of his expected lifetime
utility. But the scheme is still worthwhile, as it can be easily
shown in the proof in proposition 2, that the upper limit on the
value of annuity is independent of the time d i scouting factor if
we take it into consideration.
In order to look into the effects of the time discounting
factor on the behavior of individual subject to the scheme, let
us consider the following case under which, for simplicity, L is
assumed to take on two values only: either 0 or 1 with
probability p and( 1-p) 'respectively. Put in other words,
individual will e i tth e r be dead or alive in his second part of
life with the associated probabilities.
Under a fully-funded system, each member of generation i
faces the following problem,
• (7)
if the individual dies (L—0)
if the individual is still
alive (L=l)
wh ere is the time discounting factor,
is the per capita bequests left to generation i+1
when the individual in generation i dies at the
beginning of his retirement life,
Bi2 is the per capita bequests left when the individual
lives in the retirement period.




From (9), (10) and hQ, full-insurance optimal solution is
ensured,
(8) and (9) imply
(11)
In order to obtain concrete solutions, we assume the utility
functions to take the additive logarithmic form, i.e. U1=log(C1),
and
(9) and (31) imply the optimal choice of annuity to be (See
Appendix A)
If the annuity is a kind of income-1 inked pension where its
value is a fixed fraction of the wages received, i.e. a j= t W
where t is the individual's contribution rate to the fund, then
Note that, dtdW 0, i.e. the higher the income level of
the individual, the lesser is the rate of contribution he is
willing to pay. Put in other words. If the consumer- is free to
choose any contribution rate he likes, then those in the higher
income group will always choose a lower rate because they are
more qualified to be self-insured.
Also S can be solved from (8) to be aG(l-p), by using the
property that an individual is fully-insured under the scheme.
From the optimal values of annuity and private saving, it can be
easily observed that
.(12)
Since 001, lower value of 0 indicates a higher value of
time discounting factor. If the value of 0 is small, then future
benefits contribute little to the total expected utility to the
individual, thus less resources (both annuity and private
savings) will be saved. In the limit, S=a=0 when 0= 0, because
there is no reason for him to save if future benefits give la i rn n o
satisfaction.
. To show the effects of the scheme on the economic behavior
of the individual, let us consider the initial case without the
program under which individual in generation i chooses his
private savings and consumption levels so as to maximize his
expected lifetime utility, V4.
if the individual dies (i.e. L=0)
if the individual is still alive (i.e. L= I)
The first order conditions are
(13)
(14)
Under the assumption, of additive logarithmic u ti1it v
functions, (13) and (14) give the following solutions,
The above relationships between S and S, and c'2 and C2 are
consistent with our previous results obtained in proposition 1
and proposition 3 under w hic h private saving is 1o we r b ut
postretirement consumption rises when the pension system is
introduced. It is because annuity, to a certain extent, acts as a
substitute to private saving against future consumption. Thus the
introduction of the pension scheme would drive out part of the
initial private saving.
In the above case, total saving is unaffected by the scheme
as S= S+ a. But this specific result is only true under our
assumption that utility functions of consumption and bequests are
both logarithmic. In a general case, the effects of the scheme on
total saving is ambiguous and it has been discussed in
proposition 3.
4. 2 Myopi.c_behaviors
In the remaining part of this section, the possible effects
of myopia and the role of a mandatory pension scheme will be
investigated, based on the works of Feldstein (1985), with the
addition of an uncertainty element. If the consumer is myopic in
the sense that he understates his future pension benefits due to
the lack of confidence in the system, then t h e orig i n a 1 f u 1 I-
insurance decision may be non-opt ima i.
Suppose -the individual expects the value of his pension
benefits to be where 0 is his subjective valuation of
each dollar's future benefit and The individual chooses C2
and S to maximize
H o w e v e r the true value o f
his pension benefits is thus society chooses
maximize
subject to the consumption and saving
behavior of the individual in
Individual
Since the behavior of a single member in the society has
very little effect on society's decision rule on annuity, an
individual is assumed to take a as parameter. The first order
conditions of Max(V5) are,
(15) and (16) imply
The saving and postretirement consumption can thus be
written as a function of parameter ai from (15) and (16).
Society
When we compare the pair of first-order conditions
[( 15),( 16)] and[ (8),( IT))], it can be found that f u1 1- insurance
behavior in this Case is non-optimum. In order to show the
relationship between postretirement consumption and the expected
rate of return of annuity, we assume w i t h o u t
loss of generality. The first-order condition becomes
(IV)
for all concave h
partial-insurance behavior is optimal.
Also C 2 approaches (i.e. individual's decision
approaches full-insurance behavior) when 0 is close to 1
(i.e. individual can almost fully recognize his pension
benef its).
Furthermore, if the myopic behaviour of the individual is
not only limited in his low recogniton power on the pension
benefits, but also one may underestimate the true benefits from
future consumption and saving due to the imperfect foresight
about future. In this case, the analysis will be very different
and the true time discounting factor is set to be 1 f o r
simplicity. Individual still chooses C2 and S to maximize his
discounted lifetime expected utility, V5, but the interpretation
on 9 is different. Since individual gives a smaller weight to the
utility of future benefits due to his imperfect foresight,
society will now choose to maximize the true discounted
lifetime expected uti1 i t y
subject to the
individual's behaviour in Vg, which is characterized by (15) and
(16). The first-order conditions becomes
which mean that higher annuity level will crowd out more private
savings. However the consumer has no confidence on the pension
fund system, thus the only source used to finance postretirement
consumption and bequests comes from private saving. As long as
the private saving decreases, lower consumption level will be
adjusted.
Substitute d S° d a 9 and dCda into (18), it can be shown
that the optimal value of annuity is (See Appendix B)
u r rt
.(19)
Many people believe that a new system should not be
introduced if the individual does not fully understand the
pension fund system or he has little confidence on the operation
of the scheme, perhaps due to the political uncertainty of the
region. This is only true in that the scheme fails to function
well optimally, but its value does not disappear all together.
Though the individual cannot fully recognize his benefits from
the scheme, his welfare can be improved if appropriate value of
annuity is chosen. This point has been shown in the extreme case
that individual has no confidence on the scheme at all (i.e. 0=
0) and 0 for all 0.
It is because when the individual is myopic in the sense
that he always underestimates the true value of the pension
benefits, his liberal decisions will be non-optimal due to his
imperfect foresight about future. Thus the adoption of a
compulsory pension scheme can help to correct the distorted
behaviour and welfare gain can be obtained.
Furthermore individual may be myopic in a broader sense that
one may understates the true value of any future benefits. Let us
consider the extreme case that 0 =0, i.e. the individual is
complete myopic, a9| Q= Q= GW+Bi_1)(l-p)(2-p-t-G) 0 implies
the system is still valuable to the society. In addition, it sets
an upper bound on the optimal value of annuity since d a? d Q 0.
This result coincides with that in M.Felstein (1985) under the
case of life certainty.
Two implications can be concluded from the above analysis.
First, if individual is completely myopic, there is no reason for
him to save for future uses (by the results obtained in (8) to
(11)). However, he will be adversely affected by his
miscal ucation on the future due to his shortsightedness, as no
money will be available to finance his consumption when he is
old. The role of a mandatory scheme is significant in ensuring
the income level or the living standard of the retiree, and it
has some sense of forced saving as in Feldstein (1978). The
distorted behaviour will be lessen if the individual has more
recognition on future benefits, i.e. 0 takes a higher value.
Correspondingly, the optimal value of annuity should fall since
the liberal decision of individual approaches the true or
socially optimal one, thus less intervention will be desirable.
Second, the upper bound on the optimal value of annuity shows the
importance of the distribution of total savings in private
savings and annuity.
One may observe that the sign of dadO are opposite in (12)
and (19). It is because the interpretations of 0 are different.
In the former case, G, the actual time discounting factor,
reflects the true value of utility of future benefits.Whenever 9
is higher, the valuation of pension benefits will be greater and
thus more present resources will be transferred for future uses.
However, in the latter case, the value of 9 measures the degree
of distortion due to the inability of individual to foresee
future benefits. Therefore the smaller the value of G, the higher
will be the degree of distortion, and more government




The inclusion of bequest motive in the previous analysis
shows the significance of a pension scheme on the welfare of
generation i, given the actuarially fairness of the scheme, i.e.
the expected receipts can just cover its expected payoff. When
costs (include overhead and administrative costs) are incurred in
the ma nipulation of the system, one may suspect that the
unfairness may make the scheme undesirable. Since each individual
only receives part of his initial benefit (the other part is used
to finance the system), his net gains from the risk- pooling
process may be negative if the cost-sharing is too large. In
order to highlight the effects of cost on the valuation of the
system, we look at a case with no bequest motive, under which
the initial benefit of the risk-pooling scheme is more obvious,
and the critical value of tolerable cost will be solved out.
Without loss of generality, we assume each individual faces
a life uncertianty but he has no incentive of leaving bequest to
his heirs, through the exclusion of bequest motive in the
specification of utility functions.
If the pension fund system is not available, each individual
of generation i chooses C1 and C2 to maximize his discounted
utility [for simplicity, we set U1(.)= U 2(•)]•
or
The marginal rate of substitution (slope of indifference
curve) between present consumption( C-.) and future consumption
while each dollar of saving
today will give the individual r (1) dollars in future through
the capital market. At optimum,
implies C . In figure
2, Eq is the equilibrium point at which anc Cg ae chosen and
the expected utiity is
However, if risk-pooling is possible, individual will enter
the annuity market and private saving is completely crowded out.
It is because the only purpose of private saving is to finance
postretirement consumption as there is no bequest motive, and now
this objective can be attained with annuity. The expected return
on annuity also exceeds the market interest rate on private
saving. Thus there will be no private savings. Individual faces
the following problem under the scheme,
or
The marginal rate of substitution between present
consumption and future consumption is still
w hi'.l e -each dollar of contribution gives the
expected return of in the second period through the
annuity market. As a result, start at Eq, welfare gains must be
obtained given the indifference curves are strictly convex. At
the new optimum,
imp1ies and the expected utility is
5.2 Critical value of cost of tolerance
If the scheme incurs a cost, it is actuarially unfai'r but it
leaves the expected rate of return, r(1 -p), unaffected. The
original fair-odd line shifts downward parallelly by the
amount of cost shared by the individual. The largest tolerable
cost will be the one which pushes the line EqE-, downward to a
position that the individual is indifferent between having the
scheme or not. In figure 2, the tolerable cost is d, and Eq, E 2
are indifferent to the individual.
After tedious calculations from the set of first-order
conditions [See Appendix C], the relationship among the
consumption level in the 3 different cases is obtained as follow,
and
where and are the corresponding consumption levels in
period 1 and period 2 under the highest tolerable unfair
pension scheme, which gives the same utility as in th
In addition, the- largest, tolerable cost in having an
actuarially unfair pension scheme is d, and equals
The value of d can be shown to












V i rr n r p
The effect of (W+ B,_«) on d is positive because a large:
initial wealth allows more resources or income to be transferei
as contribution. Since the pension benefit is a fixed proportioi
of the contribution made, it permits the risk-pooling process t
be operated in a larger scale and thus the corresponding
tolerable cost is larger.
On the other hand, a' higher value of 0 means that all future
benefits, including pension benefit, yield a higher satisfaction
to the individual. Thus he is willing to pay for a greater cost
under the scheme since his gain from the risk-pooling process is
now larger.
The effect of p on the value of d is not clear cut since
there are two forces. A higher probability of death may be
compatible with a higher tolerable cost since the objective of
the pension scheme is to secure the purchasing power of the
retirees when they are still alive in the second period. Thus if
they face a higher level of risk, i.e. a larger value of p, the
benefits obtained from the risk-pooling program will be greater
and so they are willing to share a higher cost burden. On the
other hand, this higher risk of death may cause the individual to
save less for future since his expected benefit in the second
period is smaller. As a result he is more reluctant to spend on
purchasing annuity, and he is not willing to share a higher cost.
If the total cost of running a pension scheme is shared
among those individuals (who join the scheme) equally, then the
larger the number of individuals, the lesser will be the cost-
burden shared by each person( d is interpreted as the largest
tolerable cost per head). In this case, it is desirable for the
scheme to be compulsory. The scheme can be operated in a larger
scale. Its risk-pooling function can be more effective, by the
Law of Large Number, and the cost-burden of the individual can be
kept at its low.
CHAPTER 0
EFFECTS ON SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS
6.1 Uti1ity_loss in receiving bequest
In the preceding analysis, we only showed that P ar e t o
improvement can occur, in generation i, through the adoption of a
pension scheme. It is true under our assumptions that the
amount of bequest received and wages earned in their first
period of life do not change due to the scheme. Bu£ the same
conclusion cannot be simply applied to generation i+ 1 since they
may receive a very different amount of bequests under the
program.
Initially, the representative individual in generation i+1
receives a random bequests, whose size depends on how long
his father lives. He receives when his father dies early
(i.e. L= 0), while he collects a bequest of if his
father dies late (i.e. L= 1), with probability of p and (1— p)
respectively. Under the pension scheme, the value of bequest left
is certain, since individuals in generation i are all
fullv-insured.
Since the individual would lose under the scheme
if his father dies early (L= 0). By (1) and (3), and the fact that
and he would gain in the latter case
( L= 1) since Thus the effect of the scheme on
generation 1+1, depends on his attitude towards risk-bearing.
5 4 -
In order to study the role of his risk-aversion it is better 
to use the cone e p t of c e r t a i n ty e q u i v a i e nt ( Y ) to comp a r e t h e
v a l u e  of U ( B f ) and E U ( ft ? ) w h ere U (. ) i s t h e u t i I i t y o f
receiving bequest. Y e = E (B ^ ) - Y whe r e Y i s t he r 1 s k pr ern i urn , 
and
Y = Var (B|) R[E(B*)j/2
S E{B* - E(B*)}2 R[E(B*)]/2
where R (* ) is t he fu nc t i on o f ab s o1ut e r i s k-a vers ion .
If E (B J ) - E (B | ) - [ r S \ - i1-p)C* j - r S f ) /G 1 < Y,the n each
individual in generation i + 1 gains from receiving a fixed value 
of bequest, rS|• If the individual is risk-averse, the necessary 
condition t h a t h e m a y b e w or s e o f f is rS|-(l-p)C2l* > r S Y , i. e . 
his initial expected bequest recei v e d mus t. e x c e e d t h e certa i n 
value of bequest unde r t h e s c h e m e , regardless of his degr ee o f 
risk-aversion since the risk premium is always positive. But the 
actual effect on utility of receiving a different bequest; under 
the scheme depends on t h e d e g r e e o f h is risk aversion a n d the 
magnitude of the initi a 1 f l u ctuation in beq uest, by t he 
definition of the risk premium.
When the individual is more risk-averse or the divergence in
rV,the value of bequest is large, i.e. large value of C2i for given
t h e negative effect of rando rn ness o n b e q u e s t t o t h e
individual will be greater, and the scheme can help to lessen 
this effect. Thus it is highly probable that the risk p r e m i u m
would exceed the gap between the expected value of bequest under
the two cases. In general, we do not know w h e t h e r the effect o f
the scheme can dominate the negative effect of randomness in the
initial s i t u a t i o n w i t h o u t f u r t h e r i n f o r rn a t j o n a b o u t t h e u t i .1 i t v
function, as well as .the risk-aversion function since R()==
Pfodosition 5 u n d e r t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f
1o ga rit hm i c utility f unc t i ons.
Proof: See Appendix D
6.2 Combined effects on eenerat;i on i+ 1
As a result, individual in generation 1+1 may suffer a loss
in the expec t ed utility of beques t due t o the scheme. Therefor e
the true value of the program to generation i+1 depends on the
relative magnitudes between the utility loss from bequest and the
utility gain from the risk-pooling process.
We now combine the two opposi to ef f ec 1:s, on generat i on i +1,
by considering the following two situations.
Situation 1:
Individual chooses his rate of saving and consumption plan
in order to maximize the total expected utility, conditional on
random bequest received, that is
Situation 2:
The individual chooses the va1ue of annuity, together with
his saving and consumption plans in order to maximize the total
expected utility, conditional on a fixed amount of be quest
received, that is
The solutions of the problem have been found, by analogy, to
be (the time discounting factor is again put to be 1)
(full-insurance)
where'' denotes the optimal value of the solution chosen
Lemma__3: Under situation 1, we can choose the value of Si+ 1 to
be where such that
though may not be
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the optimal solution in situation 1.
E£22£ : Bee Appendix E
If S 4 . ^  *i + l + -a i 4-1 il S | + 1 , then Individ u a 1 s 1 n g e 11 e r at i 0 n i. + 1
m u s t  b e n e f i t  f  r om t h e  p e n s i o n  s c he  me . B u t  i f  t h e  c 0 n v e r s e  i s  
t r u e ,  t h e  v a  1 n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s c he me  d e p e n d s  on t h e  magrii111 de o f  z .
Let's set S ?i + 1 y I + 1 + a i + 1 + z > a n d c 2 , i + 1 = c 2 , i 4-1 t0 s e e t h e 
critical value of z such that individual will be hurt under the
scheme.
Lemma 4 SinCe V ° i + ] > V#i>i + 1 if Eh(B? + ] ) > Eh(B’j + 1) =
h(B^ + i) ,therefore individual in gene r a tio n U+ 1 wi 1 1 
gain nothing f r0m the scheme when Wj > r (W + B j _-j ).
Proof : See Appendix F
Proposition 6 : By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the utility loss of the
individual in generation 14-1 may exceed his 
ut i1i ty ga i n f r om the risk-pooling proper t y of 
the pension fund system, provided that his wage 
is sufficiently large.
This result can be explained if the individual in generation 
i + 1 has a high rate of productivity growth, then changes in his 
bequests received will have little effect on him. and his self- 
insuring ability will be higher too. Suppose B i _ ^ = rn W , then if 
productivity grows at a rate greater than r (1+ m)-1 , individual in 
generation i4-1 will be hurt.
The result, that, a fully-funded system may be p a r e 10
inef f icient, is striking because potential efficiency gain has 
b e e n s h o w n i f a p p r o p r i a t e s a v i n g a n d c o n s u m p t i o n p 1 a n s a r e 
chosen. The s imp 1 iest case Is that when aj and are set to
be S| and C 2 j .respectively, the expected utility of bequest 
received by generation i +1 rises while generation i is a 1so 
better off.
However this potential efficiency gain is unexploited if the
individual is allowed to choose his saving, consumption and
annuity rate freely. It is be c a us e g enera tions a re no t
i n dependent, bu t they are 1inked up throug h the transfer of
bequests between generatons. Put in other words, the actions or 
■t
behavior of one generation not only determine his own welfare, 
but it also affects the environment of the subsequent 
generations. However there is no channel for the s u b s e q u e n t 
generations to affect the de c i s i on of th e ea r 11e r g ener ations 
directly. Therefore earlier generation may have a right to choose 




7 *1 PaY~as~y°u~g° basis
S .i n c © fully — f u n d g d s y s t g jb c at n i1 o t e n s u r e a P a r e t o i ia p r o v e ia g n t 
in the risk-pooling process, it is necessary for us to search for 
another type of pension fund system which can serve our purpose. 
Today, many countries like the United States adopt their social 
security system on a 'pay-as-you-go' basis and the principle of 
the system is that the tax collected and benefits paid are set so 
that they ba lance annua 11y.
A pay-as-you-go system involves transfers from the working 
to the retired population. It seems that someone (generation i-l) 
will rn a k e a w i n d f a 1 1 g a i n f r o m t h e syst e m i f t he syste m i s 
introduced when generation i-l retires (i.e. generation i is the 
first generation to be taxed). But it does not affect the 
valuation, of the scheme if it can benefit everyone (the 
forthcoming generations) through some appropriate restrictions on 
the value of annuities imposed upon each generation. Besides, if 
the system only takes care of those who have made contributions 
to the pension fund, then generation i-l will have no v; i n d f a 1 1 
gain while the taxes from generation i can be used to finance the 
overhead costs of the system.
The situation can be described in the following diagram.
General; ion
T h e s c h e m e
is introduced
P e r i o d
retirement
w o r k r e t i r e me n t
w o r k retirement
7.2 Formulation of bequest function
Since the system involves an intergenerationa1 transfer, we
must first determine the utility function of leaving bequests,
i.e. the function h(). According to Barro's (1974) argument, an
individual should take full consideration of all subsequent
generations. Based on this idea, Sheshiski (1984) formulated the
bequest function to depend on the net transfer between
generations, i.e. to generation 1, h(•)= h(B s- a;) where the
contribution rate of the next generation, a, is chosen by the
current generation.
Also he has shown that the pay-as-you-go system is indeed
equivalent to the fully-funded case, i.e. 'the method of
financing has no real effect on the optimal social security'. But
it is only true if the system is announced one period ahead
before its implementation. Put in other words, the current young
generation (generation i-1) should know that they would receive a
pension benefit (a windfall gain) from the coming generation
(generation i) when they are old, otherwise the net bequests left
will not be identical under the two systems.
Though the idea that an individual should take care of all
subsequent generations is' good, it does not help us to simplify
the picture. There are two reasons. First, an individual may not
foresee the indirect uti1ities of all subsequent generations.
Second, even though he has perfect foresight, he may discount the
utilities of his remote descendants. Therefore, his subjective
vau1 ation on the indirect utilities of his heir is dampening over
To simplify the situation, let's consider the case under
wh i ch each individual only consider the welfare of the next
generation while the indirect utilites of the subsequent
generations are neglected. If the annuity rate of the next
generatfon is still determined by the current generation, then
the results obtained by S h e s h i s k i w i 1 1 be unaffected. Thus the
pay-as-you-go system will be potentially Pareto inefficient too.
In order to improve this limitation, suppose the annuity
rate is made exogenous, perhaps by a central board, then the
bequest function will depend on three elements: bequest received
from the parent generation, the expected present value of pension
benefit received from the next generation, and his own
contributions to the fund. The first two factors,measuring the
gross receipt of an individual under the scheme, have a positive
effect on the value of the net intergenerational transfer, while
the impact from the last element is obviously negative.
7,3 Effects_ on generation i
The maximum attainable utility, without the scheme, is
asstatedin
problem[ I]. If the scheme is used, individual faces the
following problem,
where and a j__ j are set by the central board and
a| is the contribution made by generation i to pay
for the pension benefit of generation i-1
The highest utility obtained is
stands for the optimal value chosen.
then the t w o systems are
indifferent. Also individual in generation 1 must be better off,
as compare with the no system case, provided that
This relationship guarantees that generation i
would receive a higher return under the system, whi1e the
benefit of the next generation will n o t be worsen off since the
expected present value of his- pension benefits can cover his
contributions.
Before our study of the effects on the subsequent
generations, we first characterize the changes in saving behavior
and consumption rate in generation i. Let's look at the pairs of
first order conditions under the two cases.
Under the scheme,
Combine the two conditions, it gives
Without the scheme, the first order conditions give
. (21)
{22)
From (21) and (22), it implies In addition,
can be deducted. If not, then
contradicting (21) and
( 22).
Therefore the changes in private saving and consumption are
the same as stated in proposition 1 and proposition 3.
7.4 Effects on eeneration
To see the effects of the scheme on generation i+ 1, we
compare the expected utility of bequest received under the two
cases. In the extreme case where
which implies N o w
let's see, under what condition, that the expected value of
bequest received would be higher under the scheme.
Suppose
Two alternatives may occur. If the difference between
is kept close, then for
sufficient large a- since 0 and given the gap
b etweer and a,- is unaffected. Also low value of
raises the possibility as given a.•. T hus
individual in generation i+ 1 can benefit from the scheme if we
enlarge the difference of to a certain level (i.e. Ga j
Alternatively, if the gap of and G a j] is
large, then utility loss may incur from receiving a low value of
bequest. However the gain from the program may be large enough to
cover this loss if the value of a+1 is sufficiently large.
The relationship above can protect the well-being of
generation 1+1, as contrast against the fully -funded case, in
that Gaj >> ra j-j aliows generation i to r ec eive a higher
pension benefit at a. jower contribution rate, so he nust be
better off and more resources can be allocated for bequest uses.
On the other hand, generation 1+1 1oses nothing because the
scheme guarantees his benefits too under our restriction of Gaj+j
ra|. Similarly, the subsequent generations will not be worse
off under the scheme if appropriate restrictions on annuities is
designed.
7.5 C on c1usio n
As„ a conclusion, a 'pay-as-you-go' pens ion system can he .1 p
us to attain Pareto improvement among generations by shifting the
burden of a higher tax on subsequent generations.
The main drawback of the system is the rapid growth in. the
size of the program and its postponement of the tax burden on
the forthcoming generations, but the individual's contribution
does not necessarily rise over time since the tax collected will
increase over time (partly du e to t h e g r owt h in population).
Pareto improvement can be achieved only if the system can operate
over time without interruption, otherwise the latest generation
in the scheme will s uf fer a h uge loss whic h has been us e d to
subsidize the earlier generations. Therefore potential external
shocks, like political uncertianty, must first be overcomed
before the implementation of the scheme.
A scheme on pay-as-you-go basis is pareto superior to the
fully-funded system because it a 1 lows the interdependence o 1
behavior between generations. The decision of the earlier
generations affect the environment of the subsequent generations
through bequest, while the tax paid by the subsequent generations
determine the pension benefits received by the earlier
generatons. Therefore their well-being and behavior are inter
related in a such a way that the earlier generations would gain




The purpose of this study is to analyse the possible effects 
of introducing a pension scheme in an small open economy. The 
effects has twofold. First, the individual's economic beh avi or 
change along with the scheme. Since the annuities bought is one 
kind of substitute to private savings, part of the initial 
planned private savings will be driven out from the budget, but 
not necessarily in an one-for-one basis. Therefore the value of 
private savings falls, but the actual effect on aggregate savings 
is indeterminate, under the scheme.
Under our model of life uncertainty, the decision of an 
individual on savings will be unaltered if the risk-poo ling 
element is excluded and the individual is assumed to be rational. 
Thus the higher expected rate of return on annuity (due to the 
risk-poo 1ing scheme) attracts people to save more in terms of 
annuity, and the effect of the scheme on private savings is 
positive becasue of this interest differential.
On the other hand, the accumulation of wealth no longer 
serves for the insurance motive against life uncertainty. The 
remaining task of private savings is to guarantee the level of 
bequests left to subsequent generations. Therefore its decreasing
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r o l e  no w c a l l s  f o r  a l o w e r  .va 1 ue  . As  a r e s u 11 , t h e  comh .1 n ed 
e f  f  e c t  i s  i n  f a c t  i n c o n c 1u s i y e .
C o n c e r n i n g  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  p o s t r e t  1 r e m e n t  c o n s u m p 1 1 o n , i 1: s 
e f f e c t  i s  mo r e  c e r t a i n .  S i n c e  t h e  r a n d o m n e s s  i n  1: he 1 e n g t  h i n 
1 i  f  e h a s  a 1 o w e r  i  m p a c t  o n t  h e i n d .1 v i d u a 1 , o n e c a n h a v e a m o r e 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p l a n  i n t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  o r  i n c o m e . As 
l o n g  a s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  i s  h i g h e r  a n d i n s it r a n c e i s 
a v a i l a b l e  unde r '  t h e  s c h e m e ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  c h o o s e  t o  be 
f u l l y -  i n s u r e d  a n d  a l a r g e r  s h a r e  o f  h i s  i nc o i o  e w i 1 1 be  u s e d  on 
c o n s u m p t i o n .  I t  i s  b e c a u s e  t h e  f e a r  on l i f e  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  
l e s s e n e d ,  and b o t h  h i s  own b e n e f i t s  and t h e  v a l u e  o f  b e q u e s t  a r e  
e n s u r e d .
S e c o n d ,  i f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s r i  s k - a v e r s e , h e i s  o f t e n  
w i l l i n g  t o  buy  some i n s u r a n c e  a g a i n s t  f u t u r e .  The a n n u i t y  ma r k e t  
p r o v i d e s  t h i s  c h a n n e l  t o  t h e  i n d i  v i d u a 1 a t  a hi  g h e r  e x p e c t e d  r a t e  
o f  r e t u r n .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  c o n s u m e r  m u s t  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  s u c h  a r i s k - p o o l i n g  c o n t r i b u t o r y  p e n s i o n  s c heme,  
s i n c e  h i s  c h o i c e  s p a c e  i s  much l a r g e r '  t h a n  b e f o r e .  B u t  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t o t a l  s a v i n g s  b e t w e e n  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g  and a n n u i t y  
i s  i mp o r t a nt ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  pa y me nt  o f  p e n s i o n  b e n e f i t  i s  c o n t i n g e n t  
on t h e  a c t u a l  l e n g t h  o f  l i f e .  An u p p e r  bound o f  a n n u i t y  i s  f ound 
t o  be s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  w e l f a r e  i mp r o v e me n t .
T h i s  r e s u l t  o f  w e l f a r e  i m p r o v e m e n t  i s  o n l y  t r u e  f o r  t h o s e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who r e c e i v e  t h e  s a me  1 e v e 1 o f  b e q u e s t .  H o w e v e r  we 
m u s t  f i r s t  l o o k  a t  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  b e q u e s t  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  
c u r r e n t  g e n e r a t i o n  ( g e n e r a t i o n  i )  b e f o r e  our  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  on t he
w e l f a r e  e f f e c t  on s u b s e q u e n t  g e n e r a t i o n s .  I t  has  been shown t h a t
the randomness in bequest received by gener ation i+ 1 is
eliminated under the sc he me. But th e scheme causes a 1ower va 1 u e
of bequest left, which outweig h t h e g a i n f r o m t he c ertainty in
t h e value of bequest; T hat is the uti 1 i ty of recei ving a f i x ed
value of bequest is less than the original expected utility of
receiving a random bequest in generation i+ 1.
The ultimate effect of the scheme on generation i+l depends
on his relative gain from the risk-pooling process and his loss
from the bequest. It has been s hown that if the individual
belongs to a high incom e g r o u p, t h e n h e m a y s u f f o r a loss f r o m
the introduction of the scheme. It is because t h e h i g her inco rn e
h e earns, the 1 o w e r is his b e n e f i t g a i n e d f r o m t h e s c h e m e s i nee
he is more qualified to be self-insured and he is less risk-
averse under our assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion.
As a result, the fully-funded system may be potential! y
Pareto inefficient in some cases. This limitation of the scheme
can be improved in another type of system under a 'pay-as-you-go'
basis. Under this new system, the burden of tax in financing the
fund is pushed onwards over time. Therefore individual now not
only faces an intertemporal choice over time, but an inter-
generational transfer is also involved.
Generations are linked up in two ways: name1y through the
bequest left and the pension benefit received. The former channel
shows the role of the current generation in determining the value
of initial wealth of subsequent generations. This effect is one¬
way only from the current generation to subsequent generations.
Though the current generation may consider the welfare of his
heirs, the behavior of his descendants has no direct effect on
his parents' decision. So it may exist some cases under which the
current generation will b,e the better off at the expense of his
descendants provided, that his own gain can outweigh the utility
loss due to the suffering of his descendants.
As a result, it is necessary to open another way under which
the behavior among generations are interdependent. The Pay-as-
you-go system provides this channel since the pension benefit
received by the current generation depends on the contribution
made by the forthcoming generation. Thus if the welfare of the
subsequent generations is hurt, then they may withdraw from the
- scheme, and the expected gain of the current generation will
disappear.
8.2 Role of a Mandatory System
Besides the two effects mentioned above the effects on
individual's economic behavior and the welfare impact on
different g en era t. ions, two special topics have been discussed in
the study. In the beginning, we assume that the individual has
perfect foresight on his future benefit and the scheme is
actuarially fair. These assumptions are relaxed in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.
It can be seen that if the individual is myopic in the sense
that he often underestimates his benefit received from the
scheme, a compulsory pension scheme is essential to guarantee his
gain from the program. The mandatory nature of the scheme
restricts the membership of the people, but the contribution rate
can be chosen freely by the individual himself. Furthermore if
the consumer is myopic in a broader sense that he understates all
future benefits, i.e. he gives little weight to his future
consumption, then the valuation of a compulsory scheme is much
higher. The role of the government under this scheme is to
correct the distorted behavior of the individual.
The actuarially unfairness of the scheme costs some doubt on
its value. Since the incorporation of operating costs and
overhead costs, the expected contributions received exceed the
value of its expected payoff. If the cost-sharing burden of each
individual is too high, then his net benefits from the scheme may
become negative. Therefore we must first find out the dritical
value of tolerable cost before our judgement on the valuation of
the scheme, and this result has been shown in Chapter 5. One
thing has to be noted is that if more people join the scheme,
then the sharing of cost will be less. Thus it is advisable for
the scheme to be operated on a large scale, and the compulsory
membership is one kind of method which can ensure the size of the
program.
8.3 Li mita tion s
A partial analysis is given in the study, which omits the
effects from other markets. For example the wage rate is fixed
within a given generation, but the equilibrium wages in the labor
market may change due to the different decisions of labor
participation in the working period, as well as his new
retirement decision.
In our paper, the life uncertainty is limited within the
retirement period which is assumed to be fixed. In fact, if the
retirement decision is made, endogenous, the picture will be more
complicated and the effect of the scheme on saving should also
include the effects resulted in earlier retirement.
Also the rate of return in both capital market and annuity
market is assumed to be fixed and there is no imperfection in the
financial market. In reality the scale of a compulsory pension
scheme is very large, thus both the size of the fund and the
efficiency of its handling will have a significant impact on the
rate of return.
In considering the welfare effect of the scheme, we only
investigate some cases which are sufficient in showing the
whether effects are positive or negative. It is because we only
want to show whether the scheme is Pareto efficient or
potentially Pareto non-optimal. In the comparison between the two
kinds of system: namely the fully-funded system and the pay-as-
you-go system, the latter one may be better if appropriate
restrictions on annuity among different generations are imposed.
This result is based on our assumptions under the
formulation of the bequest function and the role of the
government in the construction of the rate of contributions.
Without the first assumption, the two systems are equivalent, and
both are potentially Pareto inefficient under the Barro's
argument. But if the government intervenes in the determination
of the rate of contribution as she has done in the pay-as-you-go
system, the fully- funded system can be shown to be Pareto
efficient too. The reason why we do not discuss this aspect in
the paper is that the government intervention in the pay-as-you-
go system seems to be more,reasonable and practiable. Since the
model is a two-period one, if the contribution rate in generation
i +1 is made endogenous, then it will be decided by t h e m e m hers
in the current generation. So the rate is already not chosen by
the individual himself. Under the fully-funded case, each
individual initially chooses his own rate of contribution, thus
if the government steps in, his right of decision will be
challenged.
The remaining prob1em of introd ucing t he s cherne is its
' linkage among different employments. The occupational benefits
today in Hong Kong are all job-specific, i.e. the worker will not
receive his pension if he changes job in the meantime. So the
optimal plan has to improve the arrangements for the transfer of
pension rights between jobs. Therefore the plan is desirable to
be individual-specific rather than job-specific.
Many o t h e r economic issues like moral hazard, retirement
decision and the role of employers, are not discussed in the
study. Since the actual length of life is uncertain, if the
individual himself has the prior information about his health
condition, this asymmetric information may arouse the problem of
adverse selection. That is only those who believe that they can
live for long will join the scheme, thus the risk-pooling benefit
of the scheme will diminish.
Under the model of this study, the pension scheme is a self-
contributory plan of the employees. If the scheme is bipartite,
i.e. both the employers and employees have to take part in the
scheme, then the role of employers is important. Since the
contributions made by employers lower their profitability in the
product market, so the long term adjustment in wages in the labor
market as well as the changes in prices of products must be
investigated. A long term growth model should be built so as to
see the path of adjustment, and what will happen at the steady
state if any. The actual welfare effects may be studied in these
two stages: namely the adjustment period, and the long run
equilibrium state. Several extensions can be entertained by those




1 he first order conditions of the society's max i nii za t i on
problem will be (where S, a and C0 a r e optimal values
chosen)





To solve the to 1erab1q cost explicitly, let us first consider
the initial case and find out the values for and C2•
The first order condition is
Under the pension scheme, individual rather chooses Cj and C?
to maximize or equivalently chooses t to
maximize
First-order condition gives
w here indicates that annuity is a perfect substitute to
private saving on a one-for-one basis, but at a higher rate of
return.
If the scheme is actuarially unfair, the new equilibrium (E2)
can be characterized by the following conditions under which the





The values of Sp.Cand S| have been solved explicitly in
the preceding sections 'as follow, (for simplicity, we set 0 to be
on e)
For must exceed ort h e r w i s e
proposition 5 does not hold by Jensen Inequality. Now,
Let
L.H.S. of the inequality equals
Since constant (unitary) Relative Risk Aversion is implied by
the use of logarithmic utility functions
R.H.S. of the inequality equals
Suppose L.H.S. then
Contradiction as( is the number of c h i I d r e n o f e a c h
individual in -generation i, which is assumed to be not less




The value of risk premium,
approximately under our assumption of
Constant Relative Risk Aversion.
If where A is a constan t, then the risk
premium can be shown to be decreasing with A (i.e. dY'dA 0).
This result is due to our assumption of decreasing absolute risk
aversion, i.e. R'(•) 0. When the consumer has more wealth in
the period, he is more able to be self- insured and so be less
risk-averse, thus his gain from or willingness to pay for
insurance declines.
By adjusting the value of the certainty equivalent which
is defined as changes. Therefore is chosen,
given such that
where
However the changes in total savings (difference between
and
of generation i+1 depends on the magnitude of
The higher the wages earned, the lower will be the effect
of randomness in bequest received on the individual. Thus more
resources can be saved up for future uses as the initial expected












is the certainty equivalent;
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ENDNOTES
1. Hong Kong Government, Regort of an Inter-departmenta 1 Working
Party t o C on si cte r__ C e r t a in As p e c t s o f__ S o c i a 1 S e c ur i t y,
Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1967.
2. Hong Kong Management Association, Staff_Retirement_Practices
» Jane 1979, p.l.
3. Reproduce from the Staff Retirement Practices
Kong, HKMA.
4. Institutions like Hong Kong Council of Social Service and
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee.
5. Hong. Kong Government, Rep or t_ f or_ th e;_Year 1965, Government
Printer, Hong Kong, 1966, p.140.
6. Report of an_I_nter-departmental_Working_Party to Consider
Certain Aspects of Social Security, p.92.
7. Hong Kong Government, Social Welfare in Hong Kong: The_Way
Ahead, Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1973, p.21.
8. Hong Kong Government, Hel_p for Those Least Able to H e 1 p
IllPIBS e ly e s j A Programme of Social Security Dev e iopmen t,
Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1977, paragraph 2.3 and 7.5.
9. Hong Kong Government, Socia1 Welfare Into the 1 9 8 0' s,
Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1979, paragraph 3.20.
10. Hong Kong Standard, H .K. Unlikely to get CPF Scheme,
Vol.XXXVI, No.254, September 15, 1985.
11. Rodgers, B.N., Greve, J., and Morgan, J.S., Comparative
Soc ya J__Ad m i_n i_s t r a t yon, 1968, The Minerva Series No. 21.
12. Barro, R.J., Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal_of
Pall ti_cal_Economy, November 1974, pp 1095-11 17.
13. These are the basic assumptions used in Sheshinski Weiss
(1981)
14. The annuity market -is assumed to be as efficient as the
capital market, therefore their rate of return (without risk-
pooling) are the same.
15. It can be shown that var
16. The subsequent generations have the right not to join the
scheme if they are hurt, therefore the current generation may
benefit; from the scheme, conditional on the improved welfare
of the subsequent generations.
bibliography
Abel, Andrew B. Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests,
Aperi can_Economic_Reyei w, September! 1985): 777 -791.
Aker 1 of, G. A. Market for' L e rn o n s': Q u a 1 i t y U n cert a i n t y an d t h e
Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.84, No. 3,
August(1970): 488-500.
Ando, A. and Modigliani, F. The 'Life Cycle' Hypothesis of
Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests, American Economic
Review, 53(March 1963): 55-84.
Arrow, Kenneth J. Risk Perception in Psychology and Ec on'om i c s,
Lc0n0mj.c_Jn3ui.ry, 20(1982): 1- 9.
Barro, Robert J. Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal,
2 f _Po 1 i. t i. ca1_Economy, November(1974): 1095-1117.
Reply to F eld stein and Buchanan, Journal__of
Political Economy, 84(1976): 343-349.
Boskin, Michael J. and Hurd, Michael D. The Effect, of Social
Security on Early Retirement, Journal of Pub lie Economics,
(10)1978: 361-377.
Buchanan, James M. Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem,
Journal of Political Economy, April( 197 6): 337-342.
Burbidge, John B. Social Security And Savings Plans In
Overlapping-Generations Models, Journa _l_o f__ Pu b 1 i. c E con oni i. c s,
2 1( 1 983): 79-92.
Cagan, Phillip. The Effects of Pen si on _P lan s as Aggregate
Savpngs, New York, 1966.
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Population A 20-
Year Projection( Re vi sed_Edi t ionji, November 1984, Hong Kong.
Chow, Nelson W.S. The Feasibility of Contributory _Socia 1
Security Schemes in_Hong Jong_j___AStudy of Emipi oye rsj And
Employees' Opinions. Social Research Centre. C.U.H.K., NO.86.
Crawford, Vincent P. and Li lien, David M. Social Security and
Retirement, Quarteriy_Journal_of.Economics, 96(1981): 518-529.
Danziger, Ha veman and Plotnick. II o w I n come T r a n s f e r P rogr a m s
Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical
Review, Journa1_of_Economic_Litera_ture, Vol.XIX, September(1981)
: 975-1028.
Diamond, Peter A. A Framework for Social Security Analysis,
Journa]_o£_EVkIio„Economi.cs, 8(1977): 275-298.
__ and Hausman, Jerry. Retirement and Savings
Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 23(1984): 81-114.
and Mirrlees, J. A. A M ode 1 of Social
Insurance With Variable Retirement, Journa 1_ of _Pub 1_ i c_Ec on om ix s,
10(1978): 295-336.
E n d er s, W. and L a p a n, H.E. Social Security taxation and
I ntergenerationa 1 Risk Sharing, Initernat iona 1 Economic _Revj.ew,
Vol. 23, No. 3, October(1982): 647-658.
Feldstein, Martin S. The ISPE Conference on Social Insurance,
Journal of Public Economics, 10(1978): 275-276
. Social Security, Induced
Retirement, arid Aggregate Capital Accumulation, Jou rna 1 _of
Pol itical_Economy, LXXXII (October 1974): 905-926.
. Do Private Pensions Increase National
Savings?, Journa1_of_Pub1 lc_Economics, 10(1978): 277-293.
. The Optimal Level of Social Security
Benefits, Quarterly_Journal_of_Economics, Vol.(C), Issue 2,
May(1985): 303-319.
. Social Security and Saving: The
Extended Life Cycle Theory, American_Ecpnom i c_Review, Vol.(66),
No.2, M a y(19 7 6): 77-86.
Hong Kong Government. Hjelp £o£_Thos e_L ea s t_ Ab 1 e t o Help
Themselves : A Programme of Social Security Development.
Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1977.
:• Inland_Revenue Department _Report_2973-
78, Government Printer; Hong Kong.
• Regort_of_an_Inter-depa rtmenta 1_Working
Party to Consider Ce rtai n Aspects of Soci a I Security,
Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1967
. Report for the Year 1965. Government
Printer, Hong Kong, 1966.
. Socia1 We1fare in Hong Kogg y The Way
Ahead, Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1973.
,. Social Welfare into the 1980's,
Government Printer, Hong Kong.
Hong Kong Management Association, Staff_Retire ment Practices
in_Hong Kong, Management Survey, 1981.
Hong Kong Standard, H.K. Unlikely to get CPF Scheme, Vol.XXXV I,
No.254, September 15, 1985.
Hu, S.C. Social Security, the Supply of Labor, and Capital
Accumulation, American Economic Review, Vol.69, No.3, June( 1979)
: 274-283.
Internal tonal Labour Office, Geneva. The Cost_of Social
S§curi.ty, Ninth International Inquiry, 1967-71.
, Geneva. The Cost_of Social
Security, Eleventh International Inquiry, 1978-80.
, Geneva. Into_the Twenty-first
Centuries: The Deve1opment_gf_SqclaI_Security, 1984.
International Social Security Association, Geneva, Comglentary
Penslon_lns11tutes_or_Complementary_Pension_Schernes, 1971.
J u st e r, F. T. Social Security, Private Saving, and All that,
(Economic Outlook USA, Autumn, 1980, with a postscript by James
N. Morgan.) Introductory _Macroec.onomics_1.981-1982 __Reading s__on
Con temporary_ssues, Cornell, University Press, ppl21-124.
Katona, George. P.r i va te_Pen si on s_ a n d_ In dj.vj.dual__ Saying, Ann Arbor
: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan 1965.
Kotlikoff, Lawrence J. Testing the Theory of Social Security and
Life Cycle Accumulation, American__Economic Review, Vol. 69,
No.3, June(1979): 396-4 10.
Leimer, Dean and Lesnoy, Se 1 ig. S ocyajL _Securi tv_a nd_Pr i vate__Sav ing
: A Reexaminaton of the Time Ser i es Ev yd ence Usyng_ _A1_ ternat j. v e
Spc la_l_Secur ity_Wea_l th_Varya b J_es, Working Paper. Social Security
Office of Research and Statistics, Administration, Washington,
D.,C, 1980.
Lesnoy, Selig. Social Security, Inducedn 1 r'' J' r-- r~ 1 1 1 rl---' 1'-'~ 11 m+nm»«»«——. m, mr..m«•.•»»—-..— ii» u. i ni. n im—•—»---
£ot yr em en t_, and Aggregate Cap it a 1 Accumulation j A
C or re c t i. o n_a nd_Upda t i ng_y_C om me n t, Washington, D.C.: Social
Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, 1981.
Merton, Robert C. A Proposal For A Public Pension Plan, memeo,
nnrlnt ri
McGill, Dan M. Social_Security_And_Private_Pension_Plans
Competitive or Complementary?, Pension Research Council, 1977.
Pel lechio, A.J. Social Security Financing and Retirement
Behavior, Amerycan_Economic_Rev i e w, Vol.69, No.2, May( 1979):
284-287.
Robertson, A.M. The Outlook for Social Security, American
ECOnomyc_Revyew, Vol.69, No.2, May(1979): 272-274.
Rodgers, B.N., Greve, J., and Morgan, J.S. C ompa ra t i v e__S o c i a 1
Administration, 1968, The Minerva Series No.21.
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, Qua r t er JLy_ Jo ur na Q_of _E co no my eg, 90(1976): 629-647.
Samuel son, Paul A. An Exact Consumption Loan Model of Interest
with and without the Soc i a 1 Con t r i v an e e o f Money, J ou rn a 1_ of
Political .Economy, 66, No.8„ December (1 958): 467-482.
.. Optimum Social Security in a life-cycle
Growth Model, In ternatipnal__E conomic_Re vie w, Vol.16, No.3,
0ctober(1975): 5 3 9-54 4.
Sheshinski, Eytan, A Model of Social Security And Retirement
Decisions, Journa l_of _PubMc_Economi_cs, 10(1978): 337-360.
_ a n d W e i s s, Yora rn. Uncerta i n t. y and Optimal
Social Security Systems, Quarterl_Journa 1 _of_Economics,
Vol.XCVI No.2, May(1981): 189-206.
Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1983.
Social Security Programs Throughout The World_l981_---_Research
Report No. 58, U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of
Research and Statistics.
Whins ton, Michael D. Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and the
Optimal Provision of Social Insurance, Journal of
Ellkiic_Economi_cs, 22(1983): 4 9-71.
Yarri, M.E. On the Consumer's Lifetime Allocation Process,
International Economic Review, 5(1964): 304-317.
. Uncertainty Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory
of the Consumer, Review_of_Economic_Studies, XXXII (April 1965)
: 137-150.


